Tet offensive attacks on Da Nang: Difference between revisions

1968 Battle during the Vietnam War

The attacks on Da Nang (29 January – 11 February 1968), were a series of attacks in the Tet Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Viet Cong (VC) during the Vietnam War. The attacks were repulsed by combined United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Army, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) forces with the PAVN/VC suffering heavy losses.

Background[edit]

Da Nang was a major base area for United States and South Vietnamese military forces supporting operations throughout I Corps. Da Nang Air Base was one of the major air bases used for offensive air operations within South Vietnam and for the support of USMC and ARVN forces. Naval Support Activity Danang operated extensive logistics facilities on the Tiensha (Tiên Sa) peninsula east of the city. Marble Mountain Air Facility supported USMC helicopter operations throughout southern I Corps. III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) had its headquarters at Hill 327 west of the Air Base, while ARVN I Corps had its headquarters north of the Air Base.

With the departure of the 5th Marine Regiment to support operations further north in I Corps, there was only one Marine infantry regimental headquarters in the extensive Da Nang Tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). Colonel Ross R. Miner’s 7th Marine Regiment with all three of its battalions had the responsibility for the northern, western and southwestern sectors. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was in the north, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was in the center and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was in the south. With the departure of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in mid-January for Phu Bai Combat Base, the 3/7 Marines extended its area of operations to include An Hoa Combat Base to the south. Miner attached two additional companies to the 3/7 Marines, Company L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and Company H, 2/7 Marines to cover its extended area.^[1]: 141

A conglomeration of Marine support units, ARVN, ROKMC and two Marine infantry battalions attempted to secure the remaining area. In the Da Nang Vital Area, the artillery regiment, the 11th Marine Regiment, continued to oversee the Northern Sector Defense Command and the 1st Tank Battalion, the Southern Sector Defense Command. In both these sectors support troops doubled as infantry, manning fixed defensive positions and conducting patrols. Major General Donn J. Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commanding general, kept under his direct control the 3/5 Marines and the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines. Located between the Cầu Đỏ and Thanh Quýt Rivers and on either side of Highway 1, the two battalions provided the last line of defense before the so-called “Vital Area.” The most eastern of the battalions, the 2nd, shared its area with the 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which was responsible for the coastal sand flats south of Marble Mountain. Below the Marine battalions, the ROKMC 2nd Marine Brigade secured the Hội An sector and the southeastern approaches above the Ky Lam River to Da Nang Air Base. Behind the Marine and Korean lines, the ARVN 51st Regiment deployed in support of the South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development program. With both fixed-wing and helicopter gunships and more than 120 artillery pieces ranging from 4.2-inch mortars to 175mm guns, Robertson was confident that he could counter any threat that the enemy posed to Da Nang despite the thinness of his manned defenses.^{[1]: 141–2}

In the Da Nang sector, the tempo of operations had picked up during the last weeks of January. The ROKMC, while not finding any sizeable forces, continued to encounter small enemy units and boobytraps which took their toll. In the 7th Marines sector, the Marines described the same type of activity as well as increased enemy infiltration. The 3/5 Marines reported “a definite increase of enemy harassment” and the movement of sizeable enemy units into the Go Noi Island area (15°51′N 108°12′E / 15.85°N 108.2°E / 15.85; 108.2). Lieutenant Colonel William K . Rockey, the 3/5 Marines commander, commented on the “increasing frequency and ferocity” of enemy contacts. He remembered that because of the number of casualties his battalion sustained, “it was necessary to employ administrative personnel on patrols” with “clerks, cooks, and drivers” on line. In one operation near Dien Ban, the ARVN 51st Regiment sustained losses of 40 men killed, six missing, and 140 wounded while accounting for about 80 enemy dead and 13 prisoners.^[1]: 142

While activity in the Army’s 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division’s areas of operations in Quảng Ngãi and Quảng Tín Provinces was somewhat diminished, there was enough enemy in northern and central I Corps to cause concern for both the American and South Vietnamese commands. On 27 January, COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland announced a ceasefire to be observed by Allied…