Gorlice breakthrough: Difference between revisions
|casualties2 = XI Army
3,701 KIA and MIA
11,470 WIARotkirch, Graf von, Trach. Freiherr von, L. Gorlice-Tarnow. p. 78-79: Sanitaetsbericht ueber das Dcutsche Heer (Deutsche Feld- und Besatzungsheer) im Weltkriege 1914/18. Berlin. 1936. Bd. II. p. 43, OeStA-KA. AOK-Qu-Abteilung. Kaiton 2699. Op. 25150(1915).
|casualties2 = XI Army
3,701 KIA and MIA
11,470 WIARotkirch, Graf von, Trach. Freiherr von, L. Gorlice-Tarnow. p. 78-79: Sanitaetsbericht ueber das Dcutsche Heer (Deutsche Feld- und Besatzungsheer) im Weltkriege 1914/18. Berlin. 1936. Bd. II. p. 43, OeStA-KA. AOK-Qu-Abteilung. Kaiton 2699. Op. 25150(1915).
}}
}}
[[Category:Battles of the Eastern Front (World War I)]]
Eastern Front (World War I)
The ”’Gorlice breakthrough”’ occurred in May 1915 as part of the [[Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive]] during [[World War I]]. They were fought between the Russians (who were camped out along the line of the [[Dunajec river]], the right tributary of the [[Vistula river|Vistula]]) and a force led by German General [[August von Mackensen]] to push the Russians out of [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]] and Vistula land (what is now [[Poland]]).
The ”’Gorlice breakthrough”’ occurred in May 1915 as part of the [[Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive]] during [[World War I]]. They were fought between the Russians (who were camped out along the line of the [[Dunajec river]], the right tributary of the [[Vistula river|Vistula]]) and a force led by German General [[August von Mackensen]] to push the Russians out of [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]] and Vistula land (what is now [[Poland]]).
The Gorlice breakthrough occurred in May 1915 as part of the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive during World War I. They were fought between the Russians (who were camped out along the line of the Dunajec river, the right tributary of the Vistula) and a force led by German General August von Mackensen to push the Russians out of Galicia and Vistula land (what is now Poland).
Background
From August 1914 until early spring 1915, the Central powers prioritized war on the Western front to their Eastern front. This allowed Russian troops to steadily advance through Galicia, taking the Austrian territory, including the Hungarian fortress of Przemysl in March and seizing its weapons stores.[5] Progress was not easy, though and the Russian Imperial Army suffered heavy casualties. No matter how hard they were hit, they managed to recover so quickly that Prince von Bulow reportedly once said, “fighting the Russians [was] like pounding a pillow.”.[6]
As a result of the Russian advance into Austria and chatter that Italy (which was neutral) was preparing to enter the war on the side of the Allies, the situation was seen as dire for the Austrian-Hungarian empire. The Central Powers reorganized their armies and Field Marshall von Hindenburg who believed that Russia “could be defeated in a single campaign, provided enough troops were at hand” [7] gave Mackensen command of the newly created German Eleventh Army with Colonel Hans von Seeckt as his Chief of Staff.
Offensive operations of the Central Powers on the Russian front until May 1915 were carried out without numerical superiority, often with equality of forces. The key to the success of the Gorlice breakthrough was built on the creation of an overwhelming superiority in forces and means. “A quick and stunning strike in Galicia, carried out by large forces in order to achieve a decisive change in the situation in the eastern theater of operations” – this is how von Falkenhayn described the idea of the offensive on April 18, 1915. [8]. Having no advantage in manpower and machine guns in general, the Central Powers achieved an advantage in the front of the strongest of the Russian armies of the Southwestern Front and overwhelming superiority in the main attack zone (2.5 times in manpower and machine guns, almost 6 times in artillery).
Another factor of superiority and success was to be the artillery support of the operation. By the beginning of the fighting, each light battery had 1,200 shells, 15-cm howitzer batteries had 600, and batteries of 21-cm mortars had 500.
On April 27, Mackensen outlined the requirements for the operation to subordinate commanders: “The attack of the 11 Army, in order to achieve its goal, must be carried out as quickly as the operational situation requires. Only the speed of attack can prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in the rear positions and systematically bringing up stronger reserves … There are only two means for such actions: deep separation of the attacking infantry and rapid artillery pursuit by fire. Therefore, the attacking corps and divisions of the army should not think about a clearly defined task for the day, but strive by all means to advance as far as possible … You should not expect that the attack along…
Read More: Gorlice breakthrough: Difference between revisions